US History/US History (Bureau Development Inc.)(1991).ISO/dp/0000/00001.txt

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$Title{Apollo Expeditions To The Moon
Chapter 1  A Perspective on Apollo By James E. Webb}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Cortwright, Edgar M.}
$Affiliation{NASA}
$Subject{space
apollo
program
nasa
new
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$Volume{}
$Date{1975}
$Log{President Kennedy*0000101.scf
}
Book:        Apollo Expeditions To The Moon
Author:      Cortwright, Edgar M.
Affiliation: NASA
Date:        1975

Chapter 1  A Perspective on Apollo By James E. Webb

     After hundreds of thousands of years of occupancy, and several thousand
years of recorded history, man quite suddenly left the planet Earth in 1969 to
fly to its nearest neighbor, the Moon.  The ten-year span it took to
accomplish this task was but a blink of an eye on an evolutionary scale, but
the impact of the event will permanently affect man's destiny.

     In reflecting on the Apollo program, I am sometimes overwhelmed at the
sheer magnitude of the task and the temerity of its undertaking.  When Apollo
was conceived, a lunar landing was considered so difficult that it could only
be accomplished through exceptional large-scale efforts in science, in
engineering, and in the development of operational and training systems for
long-duration manned flights.  These clearly required the application of large
resources over a decade.

     Industry, universities, and government elements had to be melded into a
team of teams.  Apollo involved competition for world leadership in the
understanding and mastery of rocketry, of spacecraft development and use, and
of new departures of international cooperation in science and technology. Like
the Bretton Woods monetary agreement, President Truman's Point Four Program,
and the Marshall Plan, the Apollo program was a further attempt toward world
stability - but with a new thrust.

     This chapter will review the origins of this policy and how it was
successfully implemented.  Subsequent chapters describe how particular
problems were solved, how the astronauts and other teams of specialists were
trained and performed, how the giant spaceboosters were built and flown, and
how all this was joined together in a fully integrated effort.  In many of
these essays you will find indications of the meaning of the Apollo program to
those who devoted much of their lives to it.  In the pre-space years the main
defensive shield of the free world against Communist expansion was the
preeminence of the United States in aeronautical technology and nuclear
weaponry.  These were an integral part of a system of mutual-defense treaties
with other non-Communist nations.

     In the 1950's, when the U.S.S.R. demonstrated rocket engines powerful
enough to carry atomic weapons over intercontinental distances, it became
clear to United States and free world political and military leaders that we
had to add technological strength in rocketry and know-how in the use of space
systems to our defense base if we were to play a decisive role in world
affairs.

     In the United States the first decision was to give this job to our
military services.  They did it well.  Atlas, Titan, Minuteman, and Polaris
missiles rapidly added rocket power to the basic air and atomic power that we
were pledged to use to support long-held objectives of world stability, peace,
and progress.  The establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission as a civilian
agency had emphasized in the 1940's our hope that nuclear technology could
become a major force for peaceful purposes as well as for defense.  In 1958
the establishment of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, again
as a civilian agency, emphasized our hope that space could be developed for
peaceful purposes.  NASA was specifically charged with the expansion into
space of our high level of aeronautical know-how.  It was made responsible for
research and development that would both increase our space know-how for
military use, if needed, and would enlarge our ability to use space in
cooperation with other nations for "peaceful purposes for the benefit of all
mankind."

A Ferment of Debate

     The Apollo program grew out of a ferment of imaginative thought and
public debate.  Long-range goals and priorities within our governmental,
quasi-governmental, and private institutions were agreed on.  Leaders in
political, scientific, engineering, and many other endeavors participated.
Debate focused on such questions as which should come first - increasing
scientific knowledge or using man-machine combinations to extend both our
knowledge of science and lead to advances in engineering?  Should we
concentrate on purely scientific unmanned missions?  Should such practical
uses of space as weather observations and communication relay stations have
priority?  Was it more vital to concentrate on increasing our military
strength, or to engage in spectacular prestige-building exploits?  In the
turbulent 1960's, Apollo flights proved that man can leave his earthly home
with its friendly and protective atmosphere to travel out toward the stars and
explore other parts of the solar system.  In the 1970's the significance of
this new capability is still not clear.  Will there be a basic shift of power
here on Earth to the nation that first achieves dominance in space? Can we
maintain our desired progress toward a prosperous peaceful world if we allow
ourselves to be outclassed in this new technology?  Policymakers in Congress,
the White House, the State and Defense Departments, the National Science
Foundation, the Atomic Energy Commission, NASA, and other agencies agreed in
the 1960's that we should develop national competence to operate large space
systems repetitively and reliably.  It was also agreed that this should be
done in full public view in cooperation with all nations desiring to
participate.  However, this consensus was not unanimous.  Critics thought that
the Apollo program was too vast and costly, too great a drain on our
scientific, engineering, and productive resources, too fraught with danger,
and contended that automatic unmanned machines could accomplish everything
necessary.

     Specialized groups frequently overlooked the multiple objectives of
developing a means of transporting astronauts to and from the Moon.  Some
manned spaceflight enthusiasts deplored NASA's simultaneous emphasis on
flights to build a solid base of scientific knowledge of space.  Some critics
failed to recognize the value of having trained men make on-site observations,
measurements, and judgments about lunar phenomena, and sending men to place
scientific instruments where they could best answer specific questions.

     A vast array of government agencies participated in the network of
decision making from which the basic policies that governed the Apollo program
evolved.  Collaboration between academic and industrial contributors required
procedures that often seemed burdensome to scientists and engineers. Even some
astronauts failed at times to appreciate the potential benefits of precise
knowledge as to the effect of weightlessness and spaceflight stress on their
bodies.  Fortunately our Nation's most thoughtful leaders recognized the
necessity as well as the complexity of the various components of NASA's work
and strongly endorsed the Apollo program.  It is a tribute to the innate good
sense of our citizens that enough of a consensus was obtained to see the
effort through to success.

The Goal of Apollo

     The Apollo requirement was to take off from a point on the surface of the
Earth that was traveling 1000 miles per hour as the Earth rotated, to go into
orbit at 18,000 miles an hour, to speed up at the proper time to 25,000 miles
an hour, to travel to a body in space 240,000 miles distant which was itself
traveling 2000 miles per hour relative to the Earth, to go into orbit around
this body, and to drop a specialized landing vehicle to its surface. There men
were to make observations and measurements, collect specimens, leave
instruments that would send back data on what was found, and then repeat much
of the outward-bound process to get back home.  One such expedition would not
do the job.  NASA had to develop a reliable system capable of doing this time
after time.

     At the time the decision was made, how to do most of this was not known.
But there were people in NASA, in the Department of Defense, in American
universities, and in American industry who had the basic scientific knowledge
and technical know-how needed to predict realistically that it could be done.

     Apollo was based on the accumulation of knowledge from years of work in
military and civil aviation, on work done to meet our urgent military needs in
rocketry, and on a basic pattern of cooperation between government, industry,
and universities that had proven successful in NASA's parent organization, the
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics.  The space agency built on and
expanded the pattern that had yielded success in the past.

     Systems engineering and systems management were developed to high
efficiency.  So was project management.  New ways to achieve high reliability
in complex machines were worked out.  New ways to conduct nondestructive
testing were developed.  The best of large-scale management theory and
doctrine was used to bring together both organizational (or administrative)
optimization and join it to responsibility to work within the constraints of
accepted organizational behavior.

Large Issues of Policy

     In 1961, when President Kennedy asked me to join his administration as
head of NASA, I demurred and advised him to appoint a scientist or engineer.
The President strongly disagreed.  At a time when rockets were becoming so
powerful that they could open up "the new ocean of space," he saw this
Nation's most important needs as involving many large issues of national and
international policy.  He pointed to my experience in working with President
Truman in the Bureau of the Budget and with Secretary Acheson in the State
Department as well as to my experience in aviation and education as his
reasons for asking me to take the job.  Vice President Johnson also held this
view, and emphasized the value of my experience with high-technology companies
in the business world.

     I could not refuse this challenge, and I found that large issues of
policy were indeed to occupy much of my energy.  How could NASA, in the
Executive Branch, do its work so as to facilitate responsible legislative
actions in the Congress?  How could public interest in space be made a
constructive force?  How could other nations' help be assured?  In resolving
policy and program questions, NASA was fortunate that Dr. Hugh Dryden, as
Deputy Administrator, and Dr. Robert Seamans, as Associate Administrator, also
had backgrounds of varied experience that could bring great wisdom to the
decisions.  We early formed a close relationship and stood together in all
that was done.

     Soon after my appointment, several significant events occurred in rapid
succession.  The first was a thorough review with Dr. Dryden and Dr. Seamans
of what had been learned in both aeronautics and rocketry since NASA had been
formed in 1958 to make projections of these advances into the future.  We
examined the adequacy of NASA's long-range plans and made estimates of the
kind of scientific and engineering progress that would be required.  We
reviewed estimates of cost and found that sufficient priority and funds had
not been provided.

     The second event was the U.S.S.R.'s successful launch of the first man
into Earth orbit, the Gagarin flight on April 12, 1961.  A few weeks before
this spectacular demonstration of the U.S.S.R.'s competence in rocketry, NASA
had appealed to President Kennedy to reverse his earlier decision to postpone
the manned spaceflight projects that were planned as a follow-up to the
Mercury program.  In his earlier decision, President Kennedy had approved
funds for larger rocket engines but not for development of a new generation of
man-rated boosters and manned spacecraft.  The "talking paper" that I used to
urge President Kennedy to support manned flight included the following:

     "The U.S. civilian space effort is based on a ten-year plan.  When
prepared in 1960, this ten-year plan was designed to go hand-in-hand with our
military programs.  The U.S. procrastination for a number of years had been
based in part on a very real skepticism as to the necessity for the large
expenditures required, and the validity of he goals sought through the space
effort.

     "In the preparation of the 1962 budget, President Eisenhower reduced the
$ 1.35 billion requested by the space agency to the extent of $240 million and
specifically eliminated funds to proceed with manned spaceflight beyond
Mercury.  This decision emasculated the [NASA] ten-year plan before it was
even one year old, and, unless reversed, guarantees that the Russians will,
for the next five to ten years, beat us to every spectacular exploratory
flight. "The first priority of this country's space effort should be to
improve as rapidly as possible our capability for boosting large spacecraft
into orbit, since this is our greatest deficiency. . .

     "The funds we have requested for an expanded effort will bring the entire
space agency program up to $ 1.42 billion in FY 1962 and substantially restore
the ten-year program. . . .

     "The United States space program has already become a positive force in
bringing together scientists and engineers of many countries in a wide variety
of cooperative endeavors.  Ten nations all have in one way or another taken
action or expressed their will to become a part of this imaginative effort.
We feel there is no better means to reinforce our old alliances and build new
ones. . . .

     "Looking to the future, it is possible through new technology to bring
about whole new areas of international cooperation in meteorological and
communication satellite systems.  The new systems will be superior to present
systems by a large margin and so clearly in the interest of the entire world
that there is a possibility all will want to cooperate, even the U.S.S.R."

     President Kennedy's March decision had been to proceed cautiously.  He
had added $ 126 million to NASA's budget, mostly for engines, but postponed
the start on manned spacecraft.  In March of 1961, he was not yet ready to
move unambiguously toward a resolution of the great national and international
policy issues about which he spoke when he asked me to join the
administration.

Kennedy's Decision

     Gagarin's successful one-orbit flight in Vostok in April 1961 changed
Presidential caution into concern and resulted in the Apollo decision.

     A thoughtful scholar, Dr. John Logsdon, has described the situation in
these words:

     "The Soviet Union was quick to capitalize on the propaganda significance
of the Gagarin flight.  In his first telephone conversation with Gagarin,
Nikita Khrushchev boasted, 'Let the capitalist countries catch up with our
country.' The Communist Party claimed that in this achievement 'are embodied
the genius of the Soviet people and the powerful force of socialism.' . . .
Soviet propaganda stressed three themes: (1) The Gagarin flight was evidence
of the virtues of 'victorious socialism'; (2) the flight was evidence of the
global superiority of the Soviet Union in all aspects of science and
technology; (3) the Soviet Union, despite the ability to translate this
superiority into powerful military weapons, wants world peace and general
disarmament."

     "New York Times correspondent Harry Schwartz suggested that it appeared
likely 'that the Soviet leaders hope their space feat can further alter the
atmosphere of international relations so as to create more pressure on Western
governments to make concessions on the great world issues of the present day.'

     Logsdon also wrote: ". . . the events of April produced a time of crisis,
a time in which a sense of urgency motivated space planners and government
policy-makers to reexamine our national space goals and space programs.  This
reexamination resulted in a presidential decision to use the United States
space program as an instrument of national strategy, rather than to view it
primarily as a program of scientific research.  This decision identified, for
the world to see, a space achievement as a national goal symbolic of American
determination to remain the leading power in the world." [Logsdon, John M.,
"Decision to Go to the Moon," The MIT Press, 1970, pp. 10 and 100.]

     There were, of course, many other elements of national policy and
commitment, but it is not easy to relate them to any one event such as the
Gagarin flight.  Continued Congressional understanding and support was the
product of years of work by outstanding legislative leaders, and by devoted
committee members and staffs.  Cooperation and participation by Department of
Defense elements and leaders were essential and are shown throughout this
volume.

Working with Industries and Universities

     There is another event, however, that relates to what was done and how
NASA proceeded with Apollo.  This event was a visit from a sophisticated
senior official of a large corporation holding many aerospace contracts.  He
hit me right between the eyes with the question: "In the award of contracts
are you going to follow 100 percent the reports of your technical experts, or
are there going to be political influences in these awards?" My answer was
just as direct: "In choosing contractors and supervising our industrial
partners, we are going to take into account every factor that we should take
into account as responsible government officials."

     This meant that NASA officials would be required to meet President
Kennedy's basic guideline - that we would not limit our decisions to technical
factors but would work with American industry in the knowledge that we were
together dealing with factors basic to "broad national and international
policy." This also became our basic guideline for relations with universities
and with scientists in the many disciplines that became so important a part of
Apollo.

     We constantly endeavored to set our course so that all who participated
in Apollo could grow stronger for their own purposes at the same time that
they were doing the work to succeed in NASA's projects.  As they worked under
NASA support, we were determined not to deplete their capability to achieve
those goals that were important to them.  In essence, our policy was to help
them build strength so they could add to the Nation's strength.

     Historians will find many lessons in the Apollo program for the managers
of future large-scale enterprises.  It was a new kind of national venture.
Suddenly and dramatically it brought men of action and men of thought into
intimate working relationships designed to solve a large number of extremely
difficult scientific and technical problems.  It was a major challenge to
legislators, scientists, and engineers.

     After a careful study of the way we conducted our work, Dr. Leonard R.
Sayles and Dr. Margaret K. Chandler of the Graduate School of Business at
Columbia University wrote:

     "NASA's most significant contribution is in the area of advanced systems
design: getting an organizationally complex structure, involving a great
variety of people doing a great variety of things in many separate locations,
to do what you want, when you want it - and while the decision regarding the
best route to your objective is still in the process of being made by you and
your collaborators."

     Although our goal was clear and unambiguous, to reach it we had to use
rapidly developing technology that in turn was based on rapidly increasing
scientific knowledge.  This required our organization to be highly flexible,
and it was altered when unexpected developments made this necessary.  As
Mercury phased into Gemini, and Apollo reached its peak effort, NASA's work
force grew to 390,000 men and women in industry, 33,000 in NASA Centers, and
10,000 in universities.  By 1969, the year of the first lunar landing, this
total had been reduced by 190,000.  By 1974, it was down to 126,000.  This is
certainly an administrative record.

     No more flights to the Moon are scheduled now, and future ones will
undoubtedly be made differently, but the Apollo program has not really ended.
Instruments placed on the Moon by the American astronauts are still
transmitting important data to scientists throughout the world.  We know much
about how the Moon is bound to the Earth by invisible gravitational fields,
and how both are similarly bound to the star we call the Sun.  Daily, men and
women are learning more about that star, and about the whole universe.

Benefits from Space Technology

     No one can yet fully appraise the ultimate benefits from this historic
achievement.  Many of the technical innovations necessary for men to go to the
Moon and back have already been embodied in everyday processes and products.
These range from versatile electronic computers to fireproof bedding in
hospitals and special equipment for the handicapped.  More applications of
information acquired from space research are continually being reported.

     Possibly more significantly, the idea that if we can go to the Moon we
can accomplish other feats long considered impossible has been firmly
implanted in people's minds.  Confidence that solutions can be found to such
urgent problems as an energy shortage, environmental degradation, and strife
between nations, has been nourished by this spectacular demonstration in space
of man's capabilities.

     Apollo was a multidimensional success, triumphant not only as a feat of
scientific and engineering precision, but also as a demonstration of our
country's spirit and competence.  In the worldwide reaction at the time of the
lunar landing, it was clear that this great adventure transcended nationality
and became a milestone for mankind.  Every participant in the Apollo program
saw a slightly different facet of it.  While reading these personal accounts
and studying these pictures, you will possibly perceive more clearly the
motives, the hazards faced, and the triumphs that first enabled men to set
foot on the Moon.

[See President Kennedy: President Kennedy speaking to Congress and the nation
on May 25, 1961.]